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Jan Boone*
I analyze the effects of competitive pressure on a ﬁrm’s incentives to invest in product
and process innovations. I present a framework incorporating the selection and adap-
tion effects of product market competition on efﬁciency and the Schumpeterian argu-
ment for monopoly power. The effects of competition on a ﬁrm’s innovations depend
on whether a ﬁrm is complacent, eager, struggling, or faint, which is determined by
the ﬁrm’s efﬁciency level relative to that of its opponents. Finally, the following tradeoff
is pointed out: a rise in competitive pressure cannot raise both product and process
innovations at the industry level.
1. Introduction
n In this article I analyze the effects of competitive pressure on two types of inno-
vations: product and process innovations. I show that an important determinant of the
effect of competitive pressure on a ﬁrm’s incentives to undertake these innovations is
the ﬁrm’s efﬁciency level relative to its industry’s efﬁciency distribution. This deter-
mines whether a ﬁrm is ‘‘faint,’’ ‘‘struggling,’’ ‘‘eager,’’ or ‘‘complacent.’’ Second, I
derive conditions under which a rise in competitive pressure raises industrywide efﬁ-
ciency. Finally, I show that if a rise in pressure raises industrywide efﬁciency, then it
reduces product variety.
The motivation for this analysis is the following. The idea of Porter (1990) and
empirical articles by Baily and Gersbach (1995), Blundell, Grifﬁth, and Van Reenen
(1995), and Nickell (1996) is that competition is good for innovation. But the theoret-
ical literature is less clear on this issue: both negative and positive effects of competition
on innovation are found. Unfortunately, it is hard to compare the different results from
the theoretical literature, as a common framework is missing. For instance, as an in-
centive to innovate, Aghion and Howitt (1992) identify a proﬁt level, p, while Martin
(1993) uses the steepness of a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function with respect to its own cost level,
z]p/]cz. Further, a rise in competition is seen by Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1995) as
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a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition, while Arrow (1962) views it as a rise
in the number of ﬁrms in the industry. My article tries to bring these results together
by considering a number of parametrizations of competition and the effects of com-
petition on both the level and the steepness of the proﬁt function.
To illustrate, consider the following informal story. An individual j considers en-
tering a chess tournament where he will play one opponent. I am interested in two of
j’s decisions: whether or not he enters and how much effort he invests in preparation
for the tournament. The ﬁrst decision is determined by the utility level enjoyed by
participating. Player j participates if and only if this utility level exceeds the sum of
some entry fee and the disutility of preparation (see below). I assume that j only derives
utility from winning the tournament (that is, not from participating per se). Further,
assume that preparation (by reading some chess books, say) yields a disutility of effort
and a small increase in j’s chess skills. Hence the preparation decision is determined
by the increase in the probability that j wins the tournament due to a small increase in
j’s skills. There are two forms of the tournament. In tournament A, a player wins the
tournament if he wins ﬁve out of nine matches. Tournament B consists of just one
match, winning the match means winning the tournament. I ignore the problem of ties.
Tournament A is called more competitive than B because the more matches played,
the clearer the ability differences come out between the players. How do j’s utility
level and preparation differ between tournaments A and B?
Consider the following four plausible possibilities.1 First, if j is far worse than his
opponent, he will invest more effort in preparation in tournament B than in A. In the
more competitive tournament A, j has no chance of winning anyway. Hence, j’s in-
vestment in preparation has a very small, if any, effect on his probability of winning.
In B, however, preparation can increase the probability of winning the tournament, for
instance, if j’s opponent makes a silly mistake. Besides investing less in preparation in
tournament A, j’s utility level is lower in tournament A because he has no chance of
winning it. This I call the reaction of a faint player to competition. As competition is
increased the faint player enjoys the tournament less and gives up on preparation.
Second, if j is only a slightly less able chess player than his opponent, his reaction to
a rise in competition can be characterized as struggling. Playing tournament A is less
enjoyable for j than playing B, because of the lower probability of winning. However,
the rise in competition challenges him to ﬁght back and invest more in preparation. In
other words, the preparation effort has a bigger effect on j’s probability of winning in
tournament A than in B. So unlike the faint type, a struggler strives to improve his
skills as competition is raised. Third, if j is slightly better than his opponent, the rise
in competition makes the tournament more attractive to him and spurs him to invest
in preparation. This is the reaction of an eager player to a rise in competition. He
enjoys the rise in competition and works harder. Finally, it is conceivable that player
j becomes complacent due to the rise in competition, if he is far better than his op-
ponent. The rise in competition emphasizes his feelings of superiority. There is no
chance that he will lose tournament A. In other words, preparing for the tournament
has almost no effect on the probability of winning. Hence he prepares less and enjoys
the more competitive tournament better.
More formally, in this article I consider the effects of competitive pressure on a
ﬁrm’s incentives to undertake product innovation (associated with p, as explained be-
low) and process innovation (associated with z]p/]cz). Letting (1, 2) denote the case
1 Because I have not formally deﬁned how skills and preparation translate into the probability of
winning, the possibilities may seem arbitrary. Below, I formally deﬁne payoffs in terms of proﬁt functions
and show that these four cases indeed exist.BOONE / 551
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where a rise in pressure increases the ﬁrm’s incentive for product innovation but reduces
the incentive for process innovation, it is clear that there are potentially four cases. I
show in some simple examples that all four cases can occur and that the cases are
ordered by a ﬁrm’s cost level relative to the industry cost distribution. Roughly speak-
ing, as a ﬁrm’s cost level is raised from zero to a high level, it goes through the regimes
as follows: (1, 2), (1, 1), (2, 1), and (2, 2). In the terminology introduced above,
these cases are called complacent, eager, struggling, and faint respectively.
In fact, I deﬁne a parameter as measuring competitive pressure if it satisﬁes this
ordering condition and if a rise in the parameter reduces the proﬁts of the least efﬁcient
ﬁrm in the industry. With this deﬁnition of competitive pressure it is straightforward
to identify the selection and adaption effects of competition and the Schumpeterian
argument for monopoly power, which are interpreted here in the following way. The
selection effect says that a rise in competition selects more-efﬁcient ﬁrms from less-
efﬁcient ones. According to the adaption effect,2 a rise in competition spurs ﬁrms to
raise their productivity. The Schumpeterian argument states that ﬁrms invest more to
invent a new product if the product’s expected proﬁts are higher, and proﬁts are higher
the more monopoly power a ﬁrm has.
Then, in order to analyze the claim made by Porter (1990) and others, that a rise
in competitive pressure raises industrywide efﬁciency, I consider the effects of pressure
while all ﬁrms simultaneously adjust their product and process innovation decisions.
Conditions are derived under which a rise in competitive pressure indeed raises industry
productivity. However, it is shown that if a rise in pressure raises industry productivity,
it reduces the number of products introduced into the market. This is a drawback not
often mentioned in the policy debate on competition. The intuition for this result is as
follows. As pressure is increased, the least efﬁcient ﬁrm in the market faces a direct
rise in pressure and an indirect one via the reduction in its opponents’ costs. Both
effects reduce the least efﬁcient ﬁrm’s proﬁts and induce its exit.
The relation between the theoretical literature and my work is discussed in Section
5. In terms of the empirical literature, this work is not in the vein of Cohen and Levin
(1989), who survey studies on innovation and market structure. The reason is that with
asymmetric ﬁrms there is no simple relation between product market competition and
market structure. A ﬁrm may be a monopolist due to high barriers to entry and face
no competition, or it may be a monopolist because it is the most efﬁcient ﬁrm in the
industry and competition is so intense that less-efﬁcient ﬁrms cannot survive. In both
cases the market structure is the same, yet competitive pressure differs starkly. Work
by Baily and Gersbach (1995), Blundell, Grifﬁth, and Van Reenen (1995), and Nickell
(1996) is more in line with the analysis here, as they measure competitive pressure
directly using variables like import penetration or exposure to competition from com-
panies with best manufacturing processes.
The next section introduces competitive pressure, gives examples, and shows the
framework used. Section 3 analyzes the effects of competitive pressure on a single
ﬁrm’s incentives to innovate, and Section 4 on industrywide incentives to innovate.
Section 5 shows how the recent theoretical literature ﬁts into the framework here.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The term ‘‘adaption effect’’ is borrowed from the literature on organizational change. For instance,
Hannan and Freeman (1989, p. 12) view adaption as ‘‘organizational variability [that] reﬂects designed
changes in strategy and structure of individual organizations in response to environmental changes, threats,
and opportunities.’’ In my article, organizational variability has only one dimension: organizational efﬁciency
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2. Competitive pressure
n The deﬁnition of competitive pressure used here is geared to my subject: inno-
vation. Competitive pressure is deﬁned in terms of its effect on a ﬁrm’s incentives to
undertake product and process innovations. The result of product innovation is a new
product to introduce into the market. Hence the incentive for product innovation is
determined by the proﬁt level associated with this new product. The result of process
innovation is a reduction in a ﬁrm’s cost level. The steeper the slope of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
function with respect to its own cost level, the larger the ﬁrm’s incentive to reduce
costs.
The deﬁnition is shown to hold in six examples of parametrizations of pressure.
The examples are chosen with the idea in mind that a rise in competitive pressure
makes ﬁrms more exposed to each others’ actions. Since ﬁrms’ efﬁciency levels de-
termine their actions (here, the choice of output or price level) a rise in pressure brings
out cost differences more clearly. This view of competitive pressure differs from the
idea that a rise in competition reduces proﬁts, which is used by some of the articles
discussed in Section 5. In that case, a rise in competitive pressure cannot be distin-
guished from an industrywide bad productivity shock or fall in demand.
I am aware that the deﬁnition of competitive pressure used here does no justice
to the rich variety of interpretations held by economists. For instance, one may also be
interested in the effects of competition on industry output and consumer surplus, which
play no part here. Or one can probably think of parametrizations of pressure that do
not satisfy the deﬁnition. Yet, I think for the purpose at hand, the deﬁnition covers
enough parametrizations to warrant analysis.
N Framework. Let p(ci, c2i; ui) denote the proﬁts of ﬁrm i as a function of its own
(constant) marginal cost level ci, with []p(ci, c2i; ui)]/]ci , 0, its opponents’ (constant)
marginal cost levels c2i, and a parameter ui. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, I assume
that ﬁrms differ only in their efﬁciency level ci. Hence the proﬁt function p(·) is not
indexed by i, because ﬁrms are completely symmetric except for their efﬁciency level
ci. Now consider the effect of the parameter ui on ﬁrm i’s proﬁt level, p(ci, c2i; ui),
and the steepness of the proﬁt function, z[]p(ci, c2i; ui)]/]ciz. Then restricting attention
to the signs (that is, not considering the size) of the effects of ui on p(ci, c2i; ui) and
z[]p(ci, c2i; ui)]/]ciz, there are the four cases shown in Table 1.
Consequently, a ﬁrm i is said to be complacent if a rise in parameter ui raises i’s
proﬁt level but does not raise the steepness of i’s proﬁt function. Eager, struggling, and
faint ﬁrms are analogously deﬁned.3
In this article, I say that a parameter ui measures competitive pressure on ﬁrm i if
it satisﬁes the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. For given proﬁt function p(ci, c2i; ui), a parameter ui is said to measure
competitive pressure on ﬁrm i if there exist the values c , c , and c Î R < {1`}, ii i
ce es sf 1
where c , c , and c are functions of c2i and ui, such that ii i
ce es sf
3 In Example 2 below, ui is a discrete variable counting the number of opponents of ﬁrm i. In that case
ﬁrm i is said to be complacent if p(ci, c2i, ui 1 1) 2 p(ci, c2i, ui) . 0 and
z[]p(ci, c2i, ui 1 1)]/]ciz 2 z[]p(ci, c2i, ui)]/]ciz , 0;
ﬁrm i is called eager if p(ci, c2i, ui 1 1) 2 p(ci, c2i, ui) . 0 and
z[]p(ci, c2i, ui 1 1)]/]ciz 2 z[]p(ci, c2i, ui)]/]ciz . 0, etc.BOONE / 553
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TABLE 1 Four Firm Types
]p(c , c ; u ) i 2ii . 0
]ui
]p(c , c ; u ) i 2ii # 0
]ui








(i) c # c # c and iii
ce es sf
ci Î ^0, c & implies that ﬁrm i is complacent, i
ce
ci Î ^c , c & implies that ﬁrm i is eager, ii
ce es
ci Î ^c , c & implies that ﬁrm i is struggling, and ii
es sf
ci . c implies that ﬁrm i is faint; i
sf
(ii) c , ci if ﬁrm i is the least efﬁcient ﬁrm in the market in the sense that i
es
ci $ cj for each active ﬁrm j.
In words, the deﬁnition restricts the sequencing of the complacent-faint cases as
the cost level of ﬁrm i is increased from zero, and it excludes the possibility that a rise
in competitive pressure raises the proﬁts of the least efﬁcient ﬁrm in the market.
The sequencing is important for the interpretation of ui as a measure of competitive
pressure. If the change in ui leads to a reduction in proﬁts for low-cost ﬁrms while it
raises proﬁts for high-cost ﬁrms, it seems counterintuitive to call this a rise in com-
petition. And a rise in pressure increases a ﬁrm’s incentives to reduce costs unless it
is far ahead (complacent) or far behind (faint) its opponents. The next section discusses
the intuition for this sequencing property.
The second restriction implies the well-known idea that a rise in competitive pres-
sure in an industry with symmetric ﬁrms (that is, ci 5 cj for all active ﬁrms i and j)
reduces each ﬁrm’s proﬁt level. But with asymmetric ﬁrms it allows for a situation
where a rise in pressure raises the proﬁts of the most efﬁcient ﬁrms. Restriction (ii)
will be used in the analysis of industrywide effects of competitive pressure.
Finally, note that the deﬁnition does not require all four cases to appear for a
parameter ui to measure competitive pressure. Consider, for instance, Example 2 below,
where competitive pressure on ﬁrm i is measured by the number of i’s opponents (for
a given average cost level of the opponents). In that case it turns out that c 5 c 5 0 ii
ce es
for each ﬁrm i, that is, such a rise in competitive pressure never raises a ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Now I turn to some examples to illustrate the deﬁnition. Then the deﬁnition is
interpreted in terms of product and process innovations using a simple model in which
ﬁrms choose whether or not to enter an industry with a new product and how much
to invest to enhance the efﬁciency of the product’s production process.
N Examples. The following examples present some explicit choices for competitive
pressure ui to illustrate the framework above. The ﬁrst example is the only one where
all four cases—complacent, eager, struggling, and faint—are present. In the other ex-
amples there are no complacent ﬁrms. I use the following notational convention. If, as
for instance in Example 1, a parameter measures competitive pressure in the same way
for all ﬁrms in the industry, it is denoted by u. If, as in Example 3, the parameter
measures pressure on a speciﬁc ﬁrm i, it is denoted ui. In Appendix A it is proved that
the parametrizations of pressure in Examples 2–6 satisfy Deﬁnition 1.554 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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FIGURE 1
[]p(c; u)]/]u IN EXAMPLE 1
Example 1. Consider two ﬁrms, denoted 1 and 2, that face demand of the form
pi(xi, xj) 5 (1/x )/(x 1 x ) with i ± j and 0 , u , 1. This demand function is derived 12uu u
ii j
from a CES utility function u(x1, x2) 5 (x 1 x )1/u, where u measures the degree of uu
12
substitutability between the goods of ﬁrm 1 and 2. Firm i has marginal costs ci. I say
that pressure is increased as goods become closer substitutes, that is, u rises. The
Cournot Nash equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrm i can be written as
u ci 1 1 (1 2 u)12 cj
p(c , c ; u) 5 , with i, j 5 1, 2 and i ± j. ij 2 u ci 1 112 [] cj
Without loss of generality, cj can be normalized to one, so that proﬁts for ﬁrm i can
be written as p(c; u) 5 [1 1 (1 2 u)cu]/(1 1 cu)2, where c measures the cost gap
between ﬁrm i and j. Appendix A shows the existence of c . 0. Analyzing the second i
es
derivative ]z]p/]cz]u is very tedious; in fact, I am not able to characterize it completely.
Instead, consider Figure 1, which shows []p(c; u)]/]u as a function of c and u.
The ﬁgure suggests two distinct cases: u . u and u , u (for some cutoff point
u Î ^0, 1&), which I shall consider in turn. First, look at the case with u . u. Then
for c close to zero one can see that []2p(c; u)]/]c]u . 0. As proved in the Appendix,
for low values of c (that is, c , c ) it is also the case that []p(c; u)]/]u . 0. Hence i
es
for u . u, a ﬁrm with c close to zero is complacent. For a slightly higher value of c
one ﬁnds []2p(c; u)]/]c]u , 0 and []p(c; u)]/]u . 0, that is, an eager ﬁrm. Increasing
c further makes both []p(c; u)]/]u and []2p(c; u)]/]c]u negative: a struggling ﬁrm.
Finally, for u . u and high values of c, the term []p(c; u)]/]u stays negative while
[]2p(c; u)]/]c]u turns positive: a faint ﬁrm. Now turn to the second case, with u , u.
Then for c close to zero one ﬁnds []2p(c; u)]/]c]u , 0 and []p(c; u)]/]u . 0, that is,
an eager ﬁrm. Increasing c makes both []p(c; u)]/]u and []2p(c; u)]/]c]u negative: a
struggling ﬁrm. In other words, for u , there are no complacent ﬁrms. This suggests u ø
that complacent ﬁrms only appear in very competitive environments (u close to one)
where the cost gap between the leader and follower is very big.BOONE / 555
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Example 2. Consider the inverse demand function p(X) 5 1 2 X, where X 5 xj
n11 oj51
equals the sum of output levels of ﬁrms 1 to n 1 1. Firm i has constant marginal costs
ci, and ﬁrm i’s opponents have average marginal costs m2i 5 1/nc j. Then I say oj±i
that pressure on ﬁrm i is increased if n increases while keeping m2i constant. With ui 5 n,
ﬁrm i’s Cournot proﬁts can be written as
p(ci, c2i; ui) 5 {[1 2 (ui 1 1)ci 1 uim2i]/(ui 1 2)}2.
Then c 5 c 5 0 and ii
ce es
ìü u 1 2 u 1 1 u 1 2 ii i 2 (1 1 u m ) 1 m i 2i 2i 22 2 [] ïï (u 1 3) (u 1 2) (u 1 3) ii i
i íý c 5 max 0, . sf 22 u 1 2 u 1 1 ii 2 ïï 12 12 u 1 3 u 1 2 ii îþ
In words, this example features neither complacent nor eager ﬁrms.
Example 3. Let us use the same setup as in Example 2, but now the number of
opponents of ﬁrm i is ﬁxed at n. Here the pressure on ﬁrm i is increased if it faces
opponents with lower costs. Hence ui is deﬁned here as ui 5 1/m2i. Then it follows
that p(ci, c2i; ui) 5 {[1 2 (n 1 1)ci 1 n/ui]/(n 1 2)}2. Then c 5 c 5 c 5 0. In iii
ce es sf
words, in this setup it is impossible to model the idea that a fall in opponents’ cost
levels spurs a ﬁrm to improve its own efﬁciency. As there are only faint ﬁrms here, a
rise in pressure reduces a ﬁrm’s proﬁt level and its incentive to reduce costs.
Example 4. The setup is the same as in the previous two examples. Now ﬁrm i’s costs
equal wci, that is, labor is the only production factor and is paid a wage equal to w.
Following Porter (1990) a higher wage in the industry is interpreted as higher pressure
on all ﬁrms to innovate. The idea is that a higher wage makes differences in efﬁciency
more pronounced. Hence u 5 w, and ﬁrm i’s proﬁts can be written as
p(ci, c2i; u) 5 {[1 2 (n 1 1)uci 1 num2i]/(n 1 2)}2.
Then c 5 0, c 5 [n/(n 1 1)]m2i, and c 5 c 1 1/[2u(n 1 1)]. Hence it is possible ii i i
ce es sf es
that higher wages raise ﬁrms’ incentives to reduce ci. This gives an interesting per-
spective on a result found by Van Reenen (1996) that ‘‘innovating ﬁrms are found to
have higher wages’’ (p. 195).
Example 5. Consider a Hotelling beach of length 1 with consumers distributed uni-
formly over the beach with density 1. Firm 1 is located on the far left of the beach
and ﬁrm 2 on the far right. A consumer at position x Î ^0, 1& who buys a product
from ﬁrm 1 incurs a linear travel cost tx, and if she buys from ﬁrm 2 she incurs travel
cost t(1 2 x). Assume that each consumer buys one and only one product. Firm i has
constant marginal costs ci (i 5 1, 2). Then demand for the products of ﬁrm i equals
qi(pi, pj; t) 5 ½ 1 [(pj 2 pi)/2t]. As travel costs decrease, consumers are more inclined
to buy from the cheapest ﬁrm rather than the closest one. So as travel costs decrease,
ﬁrms’ monopoly power is reduced and pressure is higher. Measuring pressure as u 5 1/t,
the proﬁts of ﬁrm i can be written as p(ci, cj; u) 5 [(3/u 1 cj 2 ci)2]/(18/u), with
i, j 5 1, 2 and i ± j. It follows that c 5 c 5 0 and c 5 cj. ii i
ce es sf
Example 6. Consider two ﬁrms, denoted 1 and 2, where ﬁrm i (5 1, 2) faces demand556 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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of the form pi(xi, xj) 5 1 2 xi 2 uxj, with i ± j and 0 # u # 2 (where the upper bound
on u is needed to allow for an equilibrium with two active ﬁrms). Firm i has constant
marginal costs ci. I say that pressure on each ﬁrm is increased as goods become closer
substitutes, that is, as u is increased. The Cournot Nash equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrm i
can be written as p(ci, cj; u) 5 {[2(1 2 ci) 2 u(1 2 cj)]/(4 2 u2)}2. Then c 5 0, i
ce
c 5 max{0, 1 2 [(4 1 u2)/4u](1 2 cj)} and c 5 max{0, 1 2 [(4 1 3u2)/8u](1 2 cj)}. ii
es sf
Although the deﬁnition is shown to hold for these six examples, I do not claim
that it holds for any parametrization of competitive pressure. To illustrate this, I ﬁnish
this section with a counterexample.
There are two ways in which a parametrization of pressure may not satisfy the
deﬁnition above. First, the sequencing may not hold. Second, a rise in pressure may
raise proﬁts for the least efﬁcient ﬁrm in the industry. From a mathematical point of
view, there are lots of ways in which the sequencing may not hold. For instance, as
the cost level of ﬁrm i is raised from zero, it may pass through the regimes as com-
placent, eager, complacent, struggling, faint, and eager. The simplest way in which the
sequencing does not hold is related to the second condition: a rise in pressure reduces
proﬁts for a low-cost ﬁrm while it increases proﬁts for a high-cost ﬁrm. This happens
in the counterexample because the high-cost ﬁrm has a ﬁrst-mover advantage. Then a
rise in competitive pressure makes the cost disadvantage more pronounced but also
affects the ﬁrst-mover advantage. In other words, if ﬁrms are different in more dimen-
sions than costs, the cost level alone does not determine a ﬁrm’s competitive position
relative to its opponents. This stresses the importance of the assumption that ﬁrms are
completely symmetric except for their efﬁciency level.
Example 7 (counterexample). Consider the same demand and cost structure as in Ex-
ample 6, now with 0 , u , Ï2 to allow for an equilibrium with two active ﬁrms.
Suppose ﬁrm 1 has a ﬁrst-mover advantage: ﬁrm 2 chooses output level x2 after ob-
serving 1’s choice x1. As shown in Appendix A, it follows for c1 5 .4, c2 5 .35, and
u 5 1.1 that [dp1(c1, c2; u)]/du . 0 while [dp2(c2, c1; u)]/du , 0. In words, a rise in
pressure decreases the proﬁts of the low-cost ﬁrm while it increases the proﬁts of the
high-cost ﬁrm because the latter has a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
3. Competitive pressure and product and process innovations
n To interpret the taxonomy in Section 2, consider the following, which is essentially
the Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) model with two important additional features. First,
ﬁrms are asymmetric in their ability to reduce production costs. Second, I analyze the
effects of a change in competitive pressure instead of looking at the correlation between
concentration and research intensity.
Consider an agent i Î { 1 ,2 ,3 ,...}w h oh a sa nidea for a new good (also denoted
i) to introduce into the market and a process-innovation function d(c, i). This process-
innovation function d(c, i) denotes the investment agent i must make to reduce the
constant marginal production costs of good i to level c.
I analyze the following deterministic two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each agent
i decides whether or not to enter the market with a new product and, if he enters, how
much to invest to improve the efﬁciency of this product’s production process. In the
second stage, the number of ﬁrms in the market and their cost levels are common
knowledge. The ﬁrms produce output and choose independently and simultaneously
their strategic variable (output or price level).
The second-period Nash equilibrium payoffs to agent i with cost level ci are written
as p(ci, c2i, I; u), where I equals the total number of ﬁrms in the market. That is, theBOONE / 557
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following three sources of competitive pressure are explicitly introduced as arguments
in the proﬁt function. First, the lower the cost levels c2i of ﬁrm i’s opponents, the
higher the competitive pressure on ﬁrm i, as modelled in Example 3. Second, the higher
the number of opponents, measured by I, the higher the competitive pressure, as in
Example 2. The third source of competitive pressure is u, which measures how ag-
gressive the interaction is between ﬁrms, as in Examples 1, 4, 5, and 6.
I make the following assumptions on the process-innovation function d(c, i) and
the proﬁt function p(ci, c2i, I, u).
Assumption 1. The functions d(c, i) and p(ci, c2i, I; u) satisfy the following properties:
(i) d(c, i) is twice differentiable in c and satisﬁes []d(c, i)]/]c , 0, []2d(c, i)]/]c2 . 0,
and limc¯0 []d(c, i)]/]c 52 `for each i 5 1 ,2 ,...;
(ii) d(c, i) is nondecreasing in i and []d(c, i)]/]c is nonincreasing in i;
(iii) p(ci, c2i, I; u) is twice differentiable in ci, c2i, and u;
(iv) []p(ci, c2i, I; u)]/]ci , 0 and []p(ci, c2i, I; u)]/]cj $ 0 for j ± i;
(v) []2d(ci, i)]/]c . []2p(ci, c2i, I; u)]/]c for each ci, c2i, I, and u; and 22
ii
(vi) there exists a value M Î R1 such that for each value of c2i, I, and u it is the
case that z[]p(ci, c2i, I; u)]/]ciz , M. limc ¯0 i
In words, Assumption 1(i) says that a reduction in marginal production costs c
requires higher expenditure on process innovations. A small reduction in c is more
expensive, the lower the initial value of c. And reducing marginal costs to zero is
inﬁnitely expensive. Assumption 1(ii) implies that agents are arranged in such a way
that low-i agents have (weakly) better ideas than high-i agents in the following sense.
Higher-i agents spend (weakly) more to achieve a given marginal production cost level
c. And for higher-i agents, reducing costs slightly below c is (weakly) more expensive.
Assumption 1(iii) ensures that the ﬁrst derivatives of the function p with respect to
ci, c2i, and u are continuous functions of ci, c2i, and u and that the second derivative
exists. This simpliﬁes the analysis below. Further, Assumption 1(iv) states that a ﬁrm’s
proﬁts are higher if its own costs are lower and its opponents’ costs higher. The latter
implies that with competitive pressure on ﬁrm i measured by the cost level of opponent
j, there are only struggling and faint ﬁrms. Or if one assumes that the output of ﬁrm j
is decreasing in j’s marginal cost level, then this condition can be stated as ﬁrms’
products being substitutes, not complements. Assumption 1(v) guarantees the concavity
of the objective function below. Finally, I assume that the incentive to reduce costs is
ﬁnite at values of c close to zero. Together with Assumption 1(i), this implies that
ﬁrms’ marginal costs are always strictly positive in equilibrium.
In this section attention is focused on how u affects the following Nash equilibrium
outcome in the ﬁrst stage, called connected equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2. For a given proﬁt function p(ci, c2i, I; u) and level of competitive pressure
u, the ﬁrst-stage connected equilibrium (c1,...,cI, I, u) Î R 3 À 3 R is deﬁned I
1
by the following four properties:
(i) optimal cost levels: the cost level ci of each entering agent i satisﬁes
ci Î argmaxc {p(c, c2i, I; u) 2 d(c, i)};
(ii) connectedness: if agent i $ 2 enters the market, then agent i 2 1 enters as
well;
(iii) nonnegative payoffs: the last agent, denoted I, to enter the market has a non-
negative payoff p(cI, c2I, I; u) 2 d(cI, I) $ 0; and
(iv) free entry: for each I9.I it is the case that {p(cI9, c2I,I9; u) 2d(cI9,I9)} ,0. maxcI9558 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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In words, in a connected equilibrium each agent i chooses cost level ci that max-
imizes proﬁts minus process-innovation costs, taking the number of ﬁrms I and its
opponents’ cost levels c2i as given. The equilibrium is called connected because all
agents in the set {1, 2, ...,I} are active in the market. That is, I do not consider
equilibria where the presence of ﬁrm i keeps the more efﬁcient ﬁrm i 2 1 out of the
market. The last agent I to enter with a new product earns nonnegative payoffs and
agents I9.I cannot proﬁtably enter. Because the equilibrium is connected, I also
measures the total number of ﬁrms in the market. The deﬁnition implicitly assumes
that payoffs are decreasing in i, and the next lemma shows that this is indeed the case.
Lemma 1. V (i, c2i, I; u) [ maxc {p(c, c2i, I; u) 2 d(c, i)} is (weakly) decreasing in i.
Proof. For j . i it is the case that
p(c , c , I; u) 2 d(c , i) $ p(c , c , I; u) 2 d(c , i) $ p(c , c , I; u) 2 d(c , j), i 2ii j 2ij j 2jj
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from revealed preference and the second inequality
from Assumption 1. In particular, Assumption 1 (ii) implies that d(c, i) is weakly
increasing in i and Assumption 1 (iv) implies that []p(ci, c2i, I; u)]/]cj $ 0 for j ± i.
Q.E.D.
N Partial effects. In this section I consider the effects of competitive pressure u on
ﬁrm i’s incentives to invest in product and process innovations, for ﬁxed product- and
process-innovation decisions of the other ﬁrms. In other words, I consider
[dV(i, c2i, I; u)]/du and dci/du
for given c2i and I.
Corollary 1. Fix c2i and I, then for
(i) a complacent ﬁrm it is the case that [dV(i, c2i, I; u)]/du . 0 and dci/du $ 0,
(ii) an eager ﬁrm it is the case that [dV(i, c2i, I; u)]/du . 0 and dci/du , 0,
(iii) a struggling ﬁrm it is the case that [dV(i, c2i, I; u)]/du # 0 and dci/du , 0, and
(iv) a faint ﬁrm it is the case that [dV(i, c2i, I; u)]/du # 0 and dci/du $ 0.
Proof. This follows from the envelope theorem and the implicit function theorem.
Q.E.D.
This result says that for a struggling or faint ﬁrm, an increase in competitive
pressure reduces the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in product innovation as dV(·)/du # 0.
For complacent and eager ﬁrms, such a rise in pressure improves the incentive to
undertake product innovation. Using the sequencing property in Deﬁnition 1 (compla-
cent and eager ﬁrms have lower costs than struggling and faint ﬁrms), this can be
interpreted as the selection effect described by Vickers (1995, p. 13) as ‘‘when ﬁrms’
cost differ, competition can play an important role in selecting more efﬁcient ﬁrms
from less efﬁcient ones.’’
In terms of the endogenous growth literature, dV(·)/du # 0 can be interpreted as
the Schumpeterian argument for monopoly power. As pressure on a struggling or faint
ﬁrm is increased, monopoly power and proﬁt levels are reduced. This reduces the
incentive to invent a new product. For instance, Aghion and Howitt (1992) identify
the Schumpeterian argument in this way. Since in their model there is only one active
ﬁrm in the market (which by deﬁnition is then the least efﬁcient ﬁrm in the market),
Deﬁnition 1 (ii) implies that this ﬁrm is struggling or faint. In my model, inventing aBOONE / 559
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product does not necessarily yield a monopoly position. Hence for relatively efﬁcient
ﬁrms (complacent or eager), a rise in competitive pressure raises their incentive to
undertake product innovations because this rise in pressure enables them to better
exploit their cost advantage.
For eager and struggling ﬁrms, increasing pressure leads to higher investments in
process innovation as dci/du , 0. This can be interpreted as the argument put forward
by, for instance, Porter (1990) and Nickell (1996) that ﬁrms adapt to increased com-
petitive pressure by raising their productivity. This I call the adaption effect of com-
petitive pressure.
So the adaption and selection effects suggest that increasing competitive pressure
improves the average efﬁciency in an industry. The latter effect works through elimi-
nating relatively inefﬁcient ﬁrms from the market and the former through forcing ex-
isting ﬁrms to improve their efﬁciency. For complacent and faint ﬁrms, however,
competitive pressure works in the opposite direction, reducing their incentives to im-
prove efﬁciency.
The intuition for this is given in the chess story in the introduction. When a very
talented (complacent) agent plays a weak (faint) agent, increasing pressure translates
into making the difference between them more pronounced. This will reduce the faint
agent’s effort to prepare for the contest, as he no longer has even the slightest chance
of winning. That is, increasing his effort has hardly any effect on his probability of
winning. Similarly, if the talented player is far better than her weak opponent, such a
rise in pressure makes her complacent. She reduces her effort as well, since she has a
sure win anyway. This argument for the talented player seems to be most persuasive
if the number of contestants is small. Indeed, in the examples above, complacent ﬁrms
only feature in Example 1, where there are two players. With more than two players,
the gaps between players become smaller. Hence, it is more likely that a rise in pressure
spurs talented players’ efforts to get ahead of one another.
From this follows the intuition for the sequencing of signs for dci/du.I faﬁ r mi s
not that far behind or that far ahead of its opponents (that is, it is either eager or
struggling), a rise in pressure spurs it to improve its efﬁciency.
4. Industrywide effects
n In this section I consider the effects of competitive pressure u in the case where
all ﬁrms adjust their product- and process-innovation decisions. This generalization is
motivated by the policy question: What happens to industrywide product and process
innovation if competitive pressure is raised? From a theoretical point of view, the issue
is that three different sources of competitive pressure on ﬁrm i interact: u, I, and c2i.
Proposition 1 shows that a rise in competitive pressure cannot raise both product and
process innovation at the industrywide level. Proposition 2 derives sufﬁcient conditions
under which a rise in competitive pressure raises industrywide efﬁciency for the case
where all ﬁrms are symmetric.
Proposition 1. In a connected equilibrium, a rise in u either reduces at least one ﬁrm’s
efﬁciency level or (weakly) decreases the number of products, I, introduced into the
market (or both).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus, raising competitive pressure u, at best, implies a tradeoff between improving
each ﬁrm’s efﬁciency or increasing the number of new products introduced into the
market. The key to this result is condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 1. If competitive pressure560 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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u reduces each ﬁrm’s cost level ci, then the least efﬁcient ﬁrm I faces increased com-
petitive pressure from two sources: from u directly and from c2I indirectly. By Deﬁ-
nition 1 (ii) both the rise in u and the fall in c2I cause ﬁrm I’s proﬁts to fall and hence
product I may not be introduced. Conversely, if the rise in u is offset by a fall in com-
petitive pressure on ﬁrm I 1 1 due to a rise in some ﬁrms’ cost levels cj (j ± I 1 1),
ﬁrm (I 1 1)’s proﬁts may rise, thereby increasing the number of products introduced
into the market. The result also implies that, at worst, a rise in u can reduce ﬁrms’
efﬁciency and the number of products introduced into the market. This is illustrated
with an example below.
Now I turn to a formalization of the policy claim made by Baily and Gersbach
(1995), Porter (1990), and others that raising competitive pressure raises industrywide
productivity. This result is not trivial theoretically, as can be seen in Martin (1993),
who ﬁnds the complete opposite result, as discussed below. To simplify the analysis,
consider the case where all ﬁrms have the same process-innovation function denoted
by d(c), that is, d(c, i) 5 d(c) for each i 5 1 ,2 ,....Further, I focus on equilibria
where all entering ﬁrms choose the same marginal cost level c. The ﬁrst-stage equilib-
rium can be characterized in the following way, which is similar to Deﬁnition 2 except
that the connectedness requirement is irrelevant with symmetric ﬁrms.
Deﬁnition 3. An industry conﬁguration (c, I, u) Î R1 3 À 3 R is called a symmetric
equilibrium if and only if
(i) c Î {p(ci, c2i, I; u) 2 d(ci)}; argmaxci
(ii) ci 5 c for each i Î { 1 ,2 ,...,I};
(iii) p(c, c2i, I; u) 2 d(c) $ 0; and
(iv) for each I9.I it is the case that {p(cI9, c2I9, I9; u) 2 d(cI9)} , 0. maxcI9
Lemma B1 in Appendix B derives sufﬁcient conditions for such a symmetric
equilibrium to exist. One of these conditions is that ﬁrms are faint with respect to
competitive pressure as measured by I. This opens up the possibility for multiple equi-
libria, as can be seen in the following. For a given value of u, start at an initial
equilibrium (c, I, u) and raise c. Since ﬁrms’ proﬁts are increasing in their opponents’
costs (Assumption 1 (iv)), this rise in c attracts more ﬁrms in the industry, thereby
raising I. Because ﬁrms are faint with respect to I, this rise in I decreases their incentive
to reduce costs, making the outcome with higher c and higher I potentially a new
equilibrium.
In light of these multiple equilibria, it seems natural to ask whether a rise in
competitive pressure u can improve upon the equilibrium with the lowest cost level for
each ﬁrm. Thus I focus on the most efﬁcient symmetric equilibrium, which is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. For given u, a symmetric equilibrium (c, I, u) is called a most efﬁcient
symmetric equilibrium if and only if there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium
(c9, I9, u) with c9,c.
The next result formalizes the policy claim that raising competitive pressure raises
industrywide productivity. Note that due to the focus on symmetric equilibria, Deﬁ-
nition 1 (ii) implies that ﬁrms cannot be complacent or eager.
Proposition 2. Let (c9, I9, u9) and (c0, I0, u0) denote two most efﬁcient symmetric
equilibria with u0.u9. Assume that for each c $ 0 and I $ 1, the following two
conditions, evaluated at ci 5 c and c2i 5 (c, ...,c), hold:
(i) Each ﬁrm i is struggling with respect to pressure as measured by u;
(ii) each ﬁrm i is faint with respect to pressure as measured by I.BOONE / 561
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TABLE 2 Decisions of Firms 1 and 2 as a Function of















Firm 2 does not enter
Then it is the case that c0 # c9.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus, raising competitive pressure from u9 to u0 (weakly) raises the efﬁciency of
each (surviving) ﬁrm if each ﬁrm is struggling with respect to pressure as measured
by u and faint with respect to pressure as measured by I. The intuition for these
conditions is the following. First, the rise in u should increase ﬁrms’ incentives to
reduce their marginal costs. That is, ﬁrms should be struggling with respect to u.
Second, Proposition 1 implies that in this case, where all ﬁrms become more efﬁcient,
ﬁrm I9 is likely not to enter. That is, I0 # I9. The condition that ﬁrms are faint with
respect to pressure as measured by I guarantees that this fall in I cannot overturn ﬁrms’
raised incentives (due to u) to reduce costs. In other words, if ﬁrms were struggling
with respect to pressure as measured by I, the fall in I reduces their incentives to reduce
costs, which could overturn the result. Summarizing, it is indeed possible that a rise in
competitive pressure u increases each (surviving) ﬁrm’s efﬁciency. However, there is
no reason to suppose that this is always the case.
Returning to the case of asymmetric ﬁrms, the next example shows that a rise in
competitive pressure u can reduce both the number of ﬁrms in the market and the
efﬁciency level of the remaining ﬁrm in the market, because this ﬁrm is neither faint
nor complacent with respect to pressure as measured by I. The intuition for this result
is that a rise in pressure u that reduces the number of ﬁrms in the market through the
selection effect can reduce overall pressure on the remaining ﬁrms. This reduction in
overall pressure weakens the remaining ﬁrms’ incentives to enhance efﬁciency.
Example 8. Consider two ﬁrms facing the demand structure in Example 6. Firm 2
has given constant marginal costs equal to c2 5 .75. Firm 1 can invest to reduce its
constant marginal costs according to the process-innovation function d(.5, 1) 5 0,
d(.4, 1) 5 .0276, and d(.3, 1) 5 .064. In words, ﬁrm 1 has marginal costs equal to .5
if it does not invest at all and can reduce marginal costs to .3 if it invests .064 in
process innovations. Both ﬁrms have ﬁxed costs equal to zero. It is straightforward to
verify that the equilibrium outcomes for different values of pressure u are as in Table 2.
Increasing pressure from u 5 .5 to .7 triggers more investment by ﬁrm 1 to reduce
costs, by the adaption effect of competition. Increasing pressure further from u 5 .7 to
1.0 pushes the inefﬁcient ﬁrm 2 out of the market through the selection effect. This
reduction in pressure on ﬁrm 1 outweighs (trivially) the increase in u, and ﬁrm 1 invests
less in process innovations.
The symmetric case in Proposition 2 has the advantage that aggregate efﬁciency
is a scalar c. The case with asymmetric ﬁrms in Proposition 1 is more general, but it
has no natural way to introduce aggregate efﬁciency. In particular, in Proposition 1
aggregate efﬁciency is said to rise only if all surviving ﬁrms reduce their costs, which
is a rather strict condition. An intermediate case is the following. Assume each ﬁrm’s562 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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TABLE 3 Four Industrywide Regimes
Due to Rise in
Competition u






Impossible by Proposition 1
Martin (1993), Aghion and Howitt (1996)
Propositions 1, 2
Example 8
proﬁt function can be written as p(ci, C, I; u), where C is a scalar measuring both
aggregate efﬁciency and competitive pressure on a ﬁrm via its opponents’ cost levels.
For instance, in Example 3 aggregate efﬁciency can be deﬁned as an unweighted
average of the ﬁrms’ cost levels, C [ 1/Ic j. In addition, the proﬁt functions in
I oj51
this example can be written such that pressure via a ﬁrm’s opponents’ costs enters in
the form of this aggregate efﬁciency measure C.
For cases where the variable measuring competitive pressure with respect to op-
ponents’ cost levels coincides with the measure of aggregate efﬁciency C, Table 3
summarizes the following four industrywide regimes. First, as Proposition 1 shows, a
rise in competitive pressure u cannot raise both product and process innovation. Second,
Proposition 2 considers a case where a rise in competitive pressure raises aggregate
efﬁciency but reduces the number of products introduced into the market. Third, al-
though this case has not been analyzed here, it is possible that a rise in competitive
pressure increases the number of products introduced into the market while reducing
aggregate efﬁciency. For instance, Martin (1993) stresses the case where all ﬁrms invest
less in process innovation due to an increase in the number of ﬁrms in the market.
Also, Aghion and Howitt (1996) present a model where a rise in competition increases
investments in creating new product lines but reduces investments in the development
of old product lines. Finally, Example 8 illustrates the possibility that a rise in com-
petitive pressure u reduces both the number of ﬁrms in the market and the efﬁciency
of the remaining ﬁrm.
5. Product market competition in the theoretical literature
n The analysis above is related to two strands in the theoretical literature. First, I
discuss the literature on competition and innovation, then I brieﬂy mention the literature
on competition and managerial incentives where the effect of competition on the proﬁt
function plays an important role.
The seminal theoretical work on the effect of competition on innovation incentives
is Arrow (1962). Arrow compares the situation of a monopolist that can reduce its
constant marginal costs from c to c9,c with the case in which an R&D laboratory
can license a technology c9 to a ﬁrm in a homogeneous-good market with Bertrand
competition where at least two ﬁrms have access to current best technology c. He
shows that the incentive to invent c9 is always bigger in the latter case. If c9 is a drastic
innovation, this is due to the (Arrow) replacement effect, which says that higher initial
proﬁts for the incumbent reduce its valuation of the innovation. This effect is absent
in my analysis because all ﬁrms enter simultaneously, hence there is no incumbent
with initial positive proﬁts. If c9 is nondrastic, it is due to (what I call) the adaption
effect. That is, (]z]p/]cz)/]n . 0 in Arrow’s model, where n is the number of ﬁrms in
the industry. In contrast, Martin (1993, p. 446) ﬁnds that ‘‘the greater the number of
ﬁrms in the market—the greater the degree of competition—the smaller the payoff
associated with a marginal increase in ﬁrm efﬁciency.’’ Martin analyzes Example 2 in
Section 2 with symmetric ﬁrms. In that case, one can show that ci . c for all ﬁrms i
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i 5 1 ,...,n and therefore z[]p(ci, c2i; u)]/]ciz/]u # 0. In other words, the symmetry
assumption implies that all ﬁrms are faint in this example. Aghion, Harris, and Vickers
(1995) have a duopoly model in which a ﬁrm is either one step ahead of its opponent,
level, or one step behind, with proﬁts p(11), p(0), and p(21) respectively. They
assume that {][p(11) 2 p(0)]}/]u . 0 and {][p(0) 2 p(21)]}/]u , 0. In words,4 a
ﬁrm that is one step ahead is eager or struggling, while a ﬁrm that is one step behind
is faint.
The industrywide tradeoff found here between product innovation and process
innovation is reminiscent of a result found by Aghion and Howitt (1996). In their
model, a rise in competition reallocates resources away from process innovation on old
product lines to product-innovation research that creates new product lines. The intu-
ition is that developing old product lines becomes less proﬁtable as competition in-
creases, that is, ﬁrms working on old product lines are faint. Although Propositions 1
and 2 derive conditions for the opposite (adaption) effect, these results are not incon-
sistent, as argued at the end of the previous section.
The literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentives starts with
the observation that managers’ incentives are not directly linked to proﬁts because they
do not own the ﬁrms. However, proﬁts affect managers’ compensation contracts spec-
iﬁed by the ﬁrms’ owners. Hence the effect of competition on proﬁt is important in
this context as well. Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988), and Aghion, Dewatripont, and
Rey (1997) model the effect of a rise in competition as a reduction in proﬁts. This
disciplines management through the threat of liquidation. That is, they assume that
ﬁrms are either struggling or faint. Besides this threat-of-liquidation effect, Schmidt
(1997) distinguishes the value-of-a-cost-reduction effect, which is determined by the
expression {]z[]p(c; u)]/]cz}/]u. Hermalin (1992) features the same effect and calls it
the change-in-the-relative-value-of-actions effect. In Hermalin (1994) this effect ap-
pears again in the form of Example 2 (in Section 2 above) with u 5 n. None of these
articles is able to sign this effect consistently. Hermalin gives examples and parameter
values where it is positive and other parameter values where it is negative. The frame-
work presented here can play a clarifying role, because it suggests conditions to sign
this effect in terms of a ﬁrm’s relative efﬁciency position in the industry. If the ﬁrm
is eager or struggling, then this value-of-a-cost-reduction effect is positive. If the ﬁrm
is complacent or faint, the effect is negative.
6. Conclusion
n This article has analyzed the effects of competitive pressure on ﬁrms’ incentives
to innovate, for a broad class of parametrizations of pressure. I have distinguished two
types of innovations: product and process innovations. The effects of a rise in com-
petitive pressure on a ﬁrm’s incentives to invest in these innovations depend on whether
the ﬁrm is complacent, eager, struggling, or faint. A ﬁrm’s type is determined by its
efﬁciency level relative to that of its opponents. This framework brings together the
selection and adaption effects of competition on innovation and the Schumpeterian
argument for monopoly power, found in the literature. Finally, conditions have been
derived under which a rise in competitive pressure increases each ﬁrm’s investments
in process innovations to improve efﬁciency. But if the rise in pressure induces more
industrywide process innovation, it reduces industrywide product innovation.
4 Note that {][p(c9) 2 p(c0)]}/]u, with c9,c0, can be written as {]z[]p(c)]/]cz}/]u dc in order to
c0 #c9
see the similarity between their assumptions and the framework used here.564 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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I conclude with three qualiﬁcations of the analysis above, which are left for future
research. First, the results above hold only if ﬁrms compete on a level playing ﬁeld.
That is, if ﬁrms differ on more dimensions than just efﬁciency, the taxonomy will no
longer hold. Above I have given the example of an ‘‘unlevel’’ playing ﬁeld in the sense
that one ﬁrm has a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
Second, in the analysis above no explicit representation of the product space is
offered and products are simply assumed to be different. Then a fall in proﬁts due to
a rise in pressure makes it less attractive to introduce a new product, and product-
innovation research falls. However, if ﬁrms invest to explicitly position their products,
this result can be overturned. Suppose product-innovation research is needed to move
a product away horizontally from the industry standard, and more research is needed
to move it further away. Then a rise in pressure may make it proﬁtable to move further
away from the standard to create your own niche in the market, and product-innovation
research increases. This is one way to overturn the result on the industrywide tradeoff
between product and process innovation.
Finally, starting from the idea that managers are not proﬁt maximizers is another
way to argue that a rise in competitive pressure can stimulate both product and process
innovation at the industrywide level. In that case, it is reasonable to assume that a rise
in pressure that makes a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function more steep still encourages process
innovation. However, a rise in pressure that reduces a ﬁrm’s proﬁt level may in this
case act as a wake-up call for managers. That is, to avoid bankruptcy, managers have
to look for new products that can generate additional proﬁts. Hence if all ﬁrms are
struggling with respect to competitive pressure as measured by u, the number of ﬁrms
in the market, and opponents’ costs, the following is possible in this case. A rise in
pressure u improves each ﬁrm’s productivity (by making proﬁt functions steeper) and
increases the number of products introduced into the market (by reducing each ﬁrm’s
proﬁt level).
Appendix A
n In this Appendix I derive that there exists a unique value c for Example 1. Further, it is proved that i
es
the parameterizations of competitive pressure in Examples 2–6 satisfy Deﬁnition 1. This is done by (1)
deriving the critical values c , c , and c , (2) showing that c # c # c , and (3) verifying that for the ii i i i i
ce es sf ce es sf
least efﬁcient ﬁrm in market i it is the case that ci . c . Finally, the expressions for ]p1/]u and ]p2/]u in i
es
the counterexample (Example 7) are derived.
Example 1. The proﬁts of ﬁrm i can be written as p(c; u) 5 [1 1 (1 2 u)cu]/(1 1 cu)2, where c 5 ci/cj
measures the cost gap between ﬁrms i and j.
u ]p 2c
uu 5 {(ln c)[1 1 u 1 (1 2 u)c ] 1 (1 1 c )}.
u 3 ]u (1 1 c )
Hence
u ]p 1 1 c
. 0 if and only if (2ln c) . .
u ]u 1 1 u 1 (1 2 u)c
Since limc¯0 (2ln c) 51 `and (2ln c) is decreasing in c while (1 1 cu)/[1 1 u 1 (1 2 u)cu] is bounded




i y 0 if and only if c Y c . es ]u
Example 2. p(ci, c2i; ui) 5 {[1 2 (ui 1 1)ci 1 uim2i]/(ui 1 2)}2
]p 2[1 2 (u 1 1)c 1 u m ] ii i 2i 5 (2m 2 c 2 1). 2ii 3 ]u (u 1 2) ii
For i’s proﬁts and output to be positive, it must be the case that 1 2 (ui 1 1)ci 1 uim2i . 0. Therefore
]p/]ui . 0 if and only if ci , 2m2i 2 1. However, one can show that there is no cost conﬁguration
(c1, c2,...,cn11) where all ﬁrms produce proﬁtably and ci , 2m2i 21 for at least one ﬁrm i. Hence c 5 0. i
es
Although differentiating p with respect to ui has no economic meaning (since ui is a discrete variable counting
the number of i’s opponents), it is mathematically possible by viewing ui (temporarily) as a real variable.
The observation that ]p/]ui , 0 for each (ci, c2i) and ui implies that p(ci, c2i, ui 1 1) 2 p(ci, c2i, ui) , 0
for each (ci, c2i) and ui. Hence there are neither complacent nor eager ﬁrms.
Instead of considering (]z]p/]ciz)/]ui . 0, I now analyze
]p(c , c , u 1 1) ]p(c , c , u ) i 2ii i2ii 2. 0. )) ) ) ]c ]c ii
This can be written as
1 2 (u 1 2)c 1 (u 1 1)m 1 2 (u 1 1)c 1 u m ii i 2ii i i 2i (u 1 2) . (u 1 1) ii 22 (u 1 3) (u 1 2) ii
or, equivalently,
u 1 2 u 1 1 u 1 2 ii i 2 (1 1 u m ) 1 m i 2i 2i 22 2 [] (u 1 3) (u 1 2) (u 1 3) ii i
c , . i 22 u 1 2 u 1 1 ii 2 12 12 u 1 3 u 1 2 ii
Hence
ìü u 1 2 u 1 1 u 1 2 ii i 2 (1 1 u m ) 1 m i 2i 2i 22 2 ïï [] (u 1 3) (u 1 2) (u 1 3) ii i
i i íý c 5 max 0, and c 5 0. sf ce 22 u 1 2 u 1 1 ii ïï 2 12 12 u 1 3 u 1 2 ii îþ
ìü u 1 2 u 1 1 u 1 2 ii i 2 (1 1 u m ) 1 m i 2i 2i 22 2 ïï [] (u 1 3) (u 1 2) (u 1 3) ii i
ii i íý c 5 c 5 0 and c 5 max 0, . (1/2) ce es s f 22 u 1 2 u 1 1 ii ïï 2 12 12 u 1 3 u 1 2 ii îþ
(3) ci . c holds trivially for the least efﬁcient ﬁrm. i
es
Example 3. p(ci, c2i; ui) 5 {[1 2 (n 1 1)ci 1 n/ui]/(n 1 2)}2
]p
])) ]ci ]p 1 2 (n 1 1)c 1 n/u n 2nn 1 1 ii 52 2, 52 .
22 22 ]u (n 1 2) u ]uu (n 1 2) ii i i
For i’s proﬁts and output to be positive, it must be the case that 1 2 (n 1 1)ci 1 n/ui . 0. Therefore
]p/]ui,( ]z]p/]ciz)/]ui , 0 for all relevant values of ci.566 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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(1/2/3) c 5 c 5 c 5 0. iii
ce es sf
Example 4. p(ci, c2i; u) 5 {[1 2 (n 1 1)uci 1 num2i]/(n 1 2)}2
]p 1 2 (n 1 1)uc 1 num i 2i 5 2[ nm 2 (n 1 1)c ] 2ii 2 ]u (n 1 2) i
]p
])) ]ci 2(n 1 1)
5 [2unm 2 2(n 1 1)uc 1 1]. 2ii 2 ]u (n 1 2) i
For i’s proﬁts and output to be positive, it must be the case that 1 2 (n 1 1)uci 1 num2i . 0. Hence,
]p/]ui . 0 if and only if ci , [n/(n 1 1)]m2i. That is, c 5 [n/(n 1 1)]m2i. Further, (]z]p/]ciz)/]ui . 0 if and i
es
only if ci , (1 1 2unm2i)/[2(n 1 1)u] 5 [n/(n 1 1)]m2i 1 1/[2(n 1 1)u]. Consequently, c 5 0 and i
ce
c 5 c 1 1/[2(n 1 1)u]. ii
sf es
(1/2) c 5 0, c 5 [n/(n 1 1)]m2i and c 5 c 1 1/[2(n 1 1)u]. ii i i
ce es sf es
(3) For the least efﬁcient ﬁrm i it is the case that ci . m2i, hence ci . [n/(n 1 1)]m2i also holds.
Example 5. p(ci, cj; u) 5 (3/u 1 cj 2 ci)2/(18/u) 5 (3 1 u(cj 2 ci))2/18u
]p
])) ]ci [3 1 u(c 2 c )][3 1 u(c 2 c )] c 2 c ]p ji ij ji 52 , 5 .
2 ]u 18u ]u 9
For i’s proﬁts and output to be positive, it must be the case that 3 1 u(cj 2 ci) . 0. Similarly, for j’s proﬁts
and output to be positive, it must be the case that 3 1 u(ci 2 cj) . 0. Hence ]p/]u , 0 and c 5 0. Further, i
es
(]z]p/]ciz)/]u . 0 if and only if ci , cj. Hence c 5 0 and c 5 cj. ii
ce sf
(1/2) c 5 c 5 0 and c 5 cj. ii i
ce es sf
(3) ci . c holds trivially for the least efﬁcient ﬁrm. i
es
Example 6. p(ci, cj; u) 5 {[2(1 2 ci) 2 u(1 2 cj)]/(4 2 u2)}2
2[2(1 2 c ) 2 u(1 2 c )] ]p ij 2 5 [4u(1 2 c ) 2 (4 1 u )(1 2 c )] ij 23 ]u (4 2 u )
]p
])) ]ci 2
2 5 [16u(1 2 c ) 2 (8 1 6u )(1 2 c )]. ij 23 ]u (4 2 u )
For i’s proﬁts and output to be positive, it must be the case that 2(1 2 ci) 2 u(1 2 cj) . 0. Hence ]p/]u . 0
if and only if ci , 1 2 [(4 1 u2)/4u](1 2 cj). That is, c 5 max{1 2 [(4 1 u2)/4u](1 2 cj), 0}. Further, i
es
(]z]p/]ciz)/]u . 0 if and only if ci , 1 2 [(4 1 3u2)/8u](1 2 cj). That is, c 5 0 and i
ce
i 2 c 5 max{1 2 [(4 1 3u )/8u](1 2 c), 0}. sf j
(1) c 5 0, c 5 max{1 2 [(4 1 u2)/4u](1 2 cj), 0} and c 5 max{ 1 2 [(4 1 3u2)/8u](1 2 cj), 0}. ii i
ce es sf
(2) c # c if (4 1 u2)/4u $ (4 1 3u2)/8u. It is routine to verify that this last inequality holds because ii
es sf
of the assumption that u Î ^0, 2&.
(3) I prove by contradiction that ci $ cj implies ci . c . That is, suppose that ci $ cj and ci # c . ii
es es
Then the last inequality implies 1 2 ci $ [(4 1 u2)/4u](1 2 cj), which is impossible because 1 2ci ,1 2 cj by
assumption and (4 1 u2)/4u . 1 for each u Î ^0, 2&.
Example 7 (counterexample). Firm 2, taking x1 as given, chooses x2 to solve
max (1 2 x 2 ux 2 c )x . 21 2 2
x2




max 1 2 x 2 (1 2 ux 2 c ) 2 cx . 11 2 1 1 [] 2 x1
Consequently, x1 5 [1/(2 2 u2)][1 2 u/2 1 (u/2)c2 2 c1] and p1 5 [1/(4 2 2u2)][1 2 u/2 1 (u/2)c2 2 c1]2.
It follows that
u
1 2 c 2 (1 2 c ) 12 ]p 2 1 5 4[ u(1 2 c ) 2 (1 2 c )]. 12 22 ]u (4 2 2u )
Further,
]p 1 ]x 21 52 (1 2 ux 2 c ) x 1 u , 12 1 12 ]u 2 ]u
where
2 (1 2 c )(2 2 u ) u(1 2 c ) 22 u(1 2 c ) 2 21 2u 1 2 c 2 1 1 2 c 2 1 [] 22 ]x 2 1 x 1 u 51 u 1 22 2 ]u 2 2 u (2 2 u )
2 (2 1 u )(1 2 c ) 2 2u(1 2 c ) 12 5 .
22 (2 2 u )
Hence
2 ]p 1( 2 1 u )(1 2 c ) 2 2u(1 2 c ) 21 2 52 (1 2 ux 2 c ). 12 22 ]u 2( 2 2 u )
It follows at c1 5 .4, c2 5 .35, and u 5 1.1 that ]p1/]u . 0 while ]p2/]u , 0.
Appendix B
n This Appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. Further, Lemma B1 derives sufﬁcient
conditions for a symmetric equilibrium to exist.
Proof of Proposition 1. To ﬁnd out whether a rise in u may induce some ﬁrms to exit, consider the effect
of u on the value of entering for the least efﬁcient ﬁrm in the market, V(cI, c2I, I; u). By the envelope
theorem, this can be written as
I21 dV(c , c , I; u) ]p(c , c , I; u) dc ]p(c , c , I; u) I 2II 2Ii I 2I 51 . O
du ]cd u ]u i51 i
By part (ii) of Deﬁnition 1, it is the case that []p(cI, c2I, I; u)]/]u , 0. Further, again using part (ii) of this
deﬁnition but now applied to pressure as measured by the cost level of I’s opponents (where a fall in ci (i ± I)
is a rise in pressure on I), one ﬁnds that []p(cI, c2I, I; u)]/]ci . 0 for i ± I. Therefore, dci/du # 0 for each
i Î { 1 ,...,I 2 1} implies [dV(cI, c2I, I; u)]/du , 0. Hence, if V(cI, c2I, I; u) 5 0, this rise in u induces
ﬁrm I to leave the market.
Conversely, the only way in which a rise in u will solicit more product innovation, in the sense that
product I 1 1 enters the market, is that dci/du . 0 for a number of ﬁrms i. Q.E.D.
Lemma B1. In addition to Assumption 1, suppose that for a given value of u it is that case that
(i) there exists a value c0 . 0 such that
(a) for each I $ 1 it is the case that
]p(c , c , I; u) i 2i $ zd9(c )z, 0 ) )) ]ci (c ,c i,I,u) 00
where i 5 ( 1 ,...,1 )i savector of ones of dimension (I 2 1), and568 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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(b) p(c0, ø,1 ;u) 2 d(c0) . 0, where c21 5 ø because ﬁrm I 5 1 is the only ﬁrm in the market;
(ii) each ﬁrm is faint with respect to I for all symmetric conﬁgurations (c, ...,c, I).
Then a symmetric equilibrium (see Deﬁnition 3 in Section 4) exists where at least one ﬁrm enters.
Proof of Lemma B1. Deﬁne the function I(c, u)a s
I(c, u) [ max {Izp(c , ci, I; u) 2 d(c ) $ 0}. (B1) II
IÎÀ,c $0 I
In words, (I(c, u) 2 1) equals the maximum number of opponents with cost level c that a ﬁrm can face
while it is still proﬁtable to enter. By Assumption 1 (iv), I(c, u) is nondecreasing in c.
Deﬁne the function f(c, u)a s
]p(c , c , I; u) i 2i f(c, u) [ zd9(c)z 2 . (B2) ) )) ]ci [c,ci,I(c,u);u]
Note that by Assumption 1 (i) and (vi) it is the case that
f(0, u) . 0,
while by assumption (i) in the lemma it is the case that
f(c0, u) # 0.
Further, for intervals of c where the number of ﬁrms I(c, u) does not change, the function f(c, u) is continuous
in c because Assumption, 1 (i) and (iii) imply that d9(c) and ]p(·)/]ci are continuous functions of ci and c2i.
Finally, at points c where a small increase in c does change the integer value of I(c, u), the function f(c, u)
jumps upward because of Assumption (ii) in the lemma and the observation above that I(c, u) is nonde-
creasing in c. In words, if a small increase in c raises the number of ﬁrms in the market, z]p(·)/]ciz decreases
because ﬁrms are faint with respect to I and hence f(·) jumps upward.
Summarizing, for given u, the function f(·, u) is continuous, but for upward jumps, see Milgrom and
Roberts (1994). Further, for values of c close enough to zero the function f(·, u) is strictly positive, while
at c 5 c0 the function is nonpositive. Milgrom and Roberts’s theorem 1 implies that there exists a solution
c for the equation f(c, u) 5 0.
Now I will argue that a conﬁguration (c, I, u) where c solves f(c, u) 5 0 and the number of ﬁrms
equals I 5 I(c, u) is a symmetric equilibrium as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3. First, at such a conﬁguration it is
the case that
]p(c , c , I; u) i 2i 2 d9(c) 5 0, ) ]ci [c,ci,I(c,u);u]
which together with Assumption 1 (v) implies that c satisﬁes property (i) of Deﬁnition 3. Since f is deﬁned
for symmetric conﬁgurations only, property (ii) of Deﬁnition 3 is satisﬁed as well. Second, the deﬁnition of
I(c, u) implies that
p(c, ci, I; u) 2 d(c) $ 0,
while
max {p(c , ci, I 1 1; u) 2 d(c )} , 0, I11 I11
cI11
where, with a slight abuse of notation i denotes a vector with ones of dimension (I 2 1) in the ﬁrst equation
and of dimension I in the second equation. These two inequalities imply that conditions (iii) and (iv) of
Deﬁnition 3 are satisﬁed as well. Finally, the second part of assumption (i) in the lemma ensures that at least
one ﬁrm can proﬁtably enter in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Because of Assumption 1 (i) and (vi), f(0, u) . 0, where the function f(·, ·) is
deﬁned in (B2) above. Also, as shown in the proof of Lemma B1, Assumption 1 together with condition (ii)
in the proposition imply that f(·, u) is continuous in c but for upward jumps. In the proof of Lemma B1 itBOONE / 569
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is shown that (c, I, u) is a symmetric equilibrium if c solves the equation f(c, u) 5 0 and I 5 I(c, u), where
the function I(c, u) is deﬁned in (B1) above. It follows from these observations that
c9[min{czf(c, u9) 5 0} 5 inf{czf(c, u9) # 0}
c0[min{czf(c, u0) 5 0} 5 inf{czf(c, u0) # 0}.
Then, using Lemma 1 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994), to prove that c0 # c9 it is sufﬁcient to show that
f(c, u0) # f(c, u9)
for each c $ 0. This inequality follows from conditions (i) and (ii) in the proposition, as the following two
steps show. First, for given c and I, f(c, u) is decreasing in u by condition (i). Second, this condition (i)
also implies that the function I(c, u) is nonincreasing in u. Together with condition (ii), which implies that
for given c and u the function z]p/]ciz is nonincreasing in I, one ﬁnds that a rise in u also decreases f(c, u)
via a reduction in I. Hence both effects together imply that f(c, u0) # f(c, u9) for each c $ 0. Q.E.D.
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